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1663 
THE CONSTITUTION ACCORDING TO JUSTICES 
SCALIA AND THOMAS: ALIVE AND KICKIN’ 
ERIC J. SEGALL

 
“I have classes of little kids who come to the court, and they recite 
very proudly what they’ve been taught, 'The Constitution is a living 
document.’ It isn't a living document! It’s dead. Dead, dead, dead!” 
Justice Antonin Scalia
1
 
No one expects Supreme Court Justices to be completely consistent 
across the vast range of emotionally charged and controversial 
constitutional law issues they are called upon to decide. Moreover, some 
Justices, such as Stevens, O’Connor, and Breyer, reject grand theories of 
interpretation and favor a one-case-at-a-time approach to judging. 
Nevertheless, when Supreme Court Justices express strong preferences 
about proper and improper methods of constitutional interpretation, their 
opinions should be at least reasonably consistent with those positions. 
Justices Scalia and Thomas have boldly and frequently made the case 
that they resolve constitutional law cases with a strong emphasis on the 
text and original meaning of the language of the Constitution.
2
 Although 
their ideologies have nuanced differences (such as their use of precedent 
and what evidence counts towards original meaning), both Justices in their 
opinions and in their off-the-Court writings proclaim that judges should 
leave their personal values out of constitutional interpretation and only 
overturn the decisions of more accountable political officials when 
 
 
  Kathy & Lawrence Ashe Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. I 
would like to thank Professor Jonathan Adler, who disagrees with most of what comes next, for 
helpful comments.  
 1. Ushma Patel, Scalia Favors ‘Enduring,’ Not Living, Constitution, News at Princeton, 
PRINCETON UNIV. (Dec. 11, 2012, 1:00 PM), https://www.princeton.edu/main/news/archive/S35/52/ 
39O50/index.xml?section= featured. 
 2. See Eric J. Segall, Justice Thomas and Affirmative Action: Bad Faith, Confusion, or Both, 3 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. ONLINE 11 (2013), available at http://wakeforestlawreview.com/justice-
thomas-and-affirmative-action-bad-faith-confusion-or-both (stating that Justice Thomas “often claims 
that fidelity to original intent and constitutional text is the most important element of constitutional 
interpretation,” and additionally “claims that the best way for a judge to keep his personal views out of 
his judicial decisions is through rigid adherence to the text and history of the Constitution”); Scalia 
Defends Originalism as Best Methodology for Judging Law, UNIV. OF VA. SCH. OF LAW (Apr. 20, 
2010), http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/news/2010_spr/scalia.htm (stating that “[o]riginalism 
suggests that the Constitution has a static meaning,” and that originalism is “to know the original 
meaning of constitutional provisions”). 
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required to by clear text or history.
3
 Both Justices, however, have 
consistently engaged in aggressive acts of judicial review based on 
personal preferences rather than text or history. It would take a book to 
catalog the many examples where Scalia and Thomas have rather 
obviously veered from their alleged disdain for the “Living Constitution,” 
but the cases below are representative and reflect broad rules of 
constitutional law adopted by these two Justices that prohibit elected 
officials from implementing important legislative objectives. 
Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion in the Court’s latest 
campaign finance case arguing that virtually all laws that limit the 
spending of money on or for political campaigns are unconstitutional 
under the First Amendment.
4
 Although Scalia did not join that opinion, he 
too has voted to strike down almost every campaign finance law that he 
has been called upon to judge while sitting on the Court.
5
 In addition, both 
Justices have said they would prohibit Congress, the President, and every 
level of state and local government from employing any and all racial 
preferences.
6
 Both Justices would also prevent Congress from using state 
governments to help implement federal laws enacted pursuant to 
Congress’s enumerated powers,7 and they would stop most plaintiffs from 
suing any state for money damages because of the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity.
8
 In none of these examples, which cut a huge swath through 
constitutional law, and which significantly alter the ways both federal and 
state governments do business, did Justices Scalia or Thomas make 
persuasive arguments from either text or history. Thus, contrary to what 
 
 
 3. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia: A Critical Appraisal, 22 U. 
HAW. L. REV. 385, 389–90 (2000) (quoting Justice Scalia’s statement in Michael H. v. Gerald D. 
regarding judicial decisionmaking, stating that “[b]ecause such general traditions provide such 
imprecise guidance, they permit judges to dictate rather than discern the society's views. The need, if 
arbitrary decisionmaking is to be avoided, to adopt the most specific tradition as the point of 
reference . . . Although assuredly having the virtue (if it be that) of leaving judges free to decide as 
they think best when the unanticipated occurs, a rule of law that binds neither by text nor by any 
particular, identifiable tradition is no rule of law at all.” (citing Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 
127 n.6 (1989)).  
 4. McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, No. 12-536, 2014 WL 1301866, at *28 (U.S. Apr. 2, 
2014) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 5. Id. at *1; see also McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 248 (2003) (Scalia, J., 
concurring); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right To Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 483 (2007) (Scalia, J., 
concurring); Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724 (2008); Citizens United v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 385–93 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 6. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239–41 (1995) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., 
concurring). 
 7. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923–24 (1997). 
 8. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67–69 (1996). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss6/10
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Justices Scalia and Thomas would have you believe, for them, the 
Constitution is very much alive and kicking up a storm. 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 
Concluding that spending money on political campaigns is political 
speech,
9
 both Justices Scalia and Thomas have consistently voted to strike 
down state and federal laws regulating the effects of money on our 
election system. Neither one, however, has ever made a serious effort to 
harmonize these strong exercises of judicial review with the text or 
original meaning of the First Amendment.  
In the landmark Citizens United case, Justice Scalia did spend some 
time trying to show that the Founding Fathers might have deemed 
corporations to have free speech rights, though he also concluded that, 
even if the framers did not, corporations play a different role today than in 
yesteryear (a great example of the living Constitution approach).
10
 But 
Scalia did not make any effort in Citizens United, or anywhere else, to 
demonstrate that anyone living in 1791 would have privileged corporate 
political speech over legislative efforts to combat corruption.  
Last term, in McCutcheon v. FEC, Justice Thomas repeated his familiar 
refrain that the Founding Fathers thought that political speech was vitally 
important and needed special protection under the First Amendment. Fair 
enough, but that determination tells us nothing about whether the people 
alive in 1791 would have equated the writing of a campaign check by a 
person in Virginia to a politician in California as the equivalent of 
constitutionally protected political speech. Of course, even if writing a 
check is the equivalent of political speech pursuant to the original meaning 
of the First Amendment, the question remains whether such speech can be 
regulated to further the vital governmental interest in preventing 
corruption. Neither Justice has ever addressed that key issue as a historical 
matter, though Lawrence Lessig has, and concluded that the Framers’ view 
of corruption would have been broad enough to justify most campaign 
finance laws.
11
 Scalia and Thomas have not addressed that historical 
analysis. 
 
 
 9. See McCutcheon, 2014 WL 1301866, at *28–29 (Thomas, J., concurring); Citizens United, 
558 U.S. at 385–93 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 10. “Even if we thought it proper to apply the dissent’s approach of excluding from First 
Amendment coverage what the Founders disliked, and even if we agreed that the Founders disliked 
founding-era corporations; modern corporations might not qualify for exclusion.” Citizens United, 558 
U.S. at 387 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 11. Lawrence Lessig, Originalists Making It Up Again: McCutcheon and ‘Corruption’, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Striking down state and federal campaign finance laws has significant 
effects on our representative democracy. Yet, neither Scalia nor Thomas 
has ever provided significant historical analysis of the issue. I am not 
criticizing that failure as a matter of constitutional interpretation (I am no 
originalist), but it does shine a bright light on their often harsh critiques of 
the importance of text and history in other cases, such as the Court’s 
abortion
12
 and same-sex marriage
13
 cases, where they argue passionately 
against finding new (living) principles to limit legislative choices. 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
Pursuant to a “color-blind” reading of the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Justices Scalia and Thomas would prohibit state 
and federal governments, as well as all public universities, from using any 
racial criteria or preferences to remedy the formalized, legal racial 
discrimination (and slavery and segregation), that marked our country for 
most of its history.
14
 Neither Justice has ever shown that the text or history 
of that Amendment justifies such a far-reaching legal conclusion. 
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the government from denying to 
any person the “equal protection of the laws.”15 It is certainly plausible to 
read the word “equal” to prohibit any and all racial preferences, even those 
designed to foster racial equality. However, it is equally plausible to read 
the words “equal” and “laws” to justify race-based remedies that further 
the equality promised by the Fourteenth Amendment but sabotaged by 
almost 100 years of segregation, Jim Crow, and other governmental 
institutions designed for the express purpose of denying equality to 
African-Americans (such as the federal government backing billions of 
dollars of private mortgages from the 1940’s to the early 1960’s with well 
over ninety percent going to white families).
16
 In other words, the words 
“equal” and “laws” can be easily (perhaps even more persuasively) 
 
 
THEDAILYBEAST.COM (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/04/02/originalists-
making-it-up-again-mccutcheon-and-corruption.html. 
 12. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part) (concluding that abortion is not constitutionally protected “because of two 
simple facts: (1) the Constitution says absolutely nothing about it, and (2) the longstanding traditions 
of American society have permitted it to be legally proscribed”). 
 13. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 14. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239–41 (1995) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., 
concurring). 
 15. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 16. See ERIC J. SEGALL, SUPREME MYTHS: WHY THE SUPREME COURT IS NOT A COURT AND ITS 
JUSTICES ARE NOT JUDGES 97 (2012). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss6/10
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interpreted to embrace, not prohibit, race-based measures enacted to 
prevent the kind of caste society the Fourteenth Amendment was supposed 
to abolish. 
 Because the text is ambiguous, both Justices would normally say turn 
to history. An historical analysis, however, certainly does not favor a 
color-blind interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. When it was 
ratified, schools were officially segregated in the District of Columbia,
17
 
and there were federal laws giving benefits to blacks and only blacks.
18
 
Incredibly, neither Justice Scalia nor Justice Thomas has ever addressed 
this specific history or even the original meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as applied to limited racial preferences. Moreover, not long 
after the Amendment was ratified, the Supreme Court embraced an 
interpretation of “equal” that was as far from colorblind as possible when 
it upheld a Louisiana law requiring the separation of the races on public 
transportation.
19
  
Given the national importance of this issue, and how if there were five 
votes supporting the rule these Justices favor, most public universities 
would have to significantly restructure their admissions programs, we 
would expect either Justice Scalia or Thomas to provide an historical 
justification for their invalidation of all racial preferences. But, for 
whatever reason, they have not.
20
  
 
 
 17. Stephen A. Siegel, The Federal Government’s Power to Enact Color-Conscious Laws: An 
Originalist Inquiry, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 477, 551 (1998) (“Although by 1869 a few citizens had begun 
to agitate for integrated schools, Congress spurned all such suggestions and allowed school 
segregation to continue in the District until the Supreme Court held it unconstitutional in 1954.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
 18. See Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 754 (1985) (“From the closing days of the Civil War until the end of 
civilian Reconstruction some five years later, Congress adopted a series of social welfare programs 
whose benefits were expressly limited to blacks.”). 
 19. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 
Kan., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that a state law requiring black and white railway passengers to be 
separated did not violate either the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendment). 
 20. Justice Thomas has discussed the speeches of Fredrick Douglass given well after the 
Fourteenth Amendment was enacted. But, not only does this evidence not shine a light on the original 
meaning of the Amendment, Justice Thomas mischaracterizes and misquotes Mr. Douglas. See Segall, 
supra note 2 (stating that “Justice Thomas took Douglass out of context, omitted relevant parts of the 
very quote he relied on for his color-blind argument, and failed to review much of Douglass’s life 
work, some of which strongly leads to the opposite conclusions about affirmative action asserted by 
Justice Thomas”).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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COMMANDEERING 
Pursuant to the Tenth Amendment, the federal government is limited to 
those powers that are enumerated in the Constitution, and even those 
powers are subject to other Constitutional provisions.
21
 Thus, pursuant to 
the Commerce Clause,
22
 Congress could regulate shipping newspapers 
across state lines for profit, but the First Amendment would render 
unconstitutional a law favoring Republican newspapers over Democratic 
newspapers. Assuming no other textual constitutional limitation, however, 
federal laws enacted pursuant to an enumerated power are the supreme law 
of the land under Article VI.
23
 
Despite the text of both Article VI and the Tenth Amendment, 
however, the Court in the 1990s held that when Congress exercises 
enumerated powers under Article I, it may not require states to assist in the 
implementation of federal law.
24
 In these cases, Congress directed the 
states to clean up radioactive waste and to help conduct background 
checks on gun purchasers. In both cases, the Court struck down the federal 
laws. 
In both of these cases, the Justices unanimously agreed there was no 
textual limitation on Congress commandeering the states to assist with the 
execution of federal law. In light of that fact, one would think an 
“originalist” jurist would rely on strong historical evidence to support such 
a determination. There is, however, no such evidence available.  
In New York v. United States, Justice O’Connor presented a general 
overview of what the framers thought about federal and state powers but 
did not refer to any specific evidence helpful to this question. Instead, she 
simply assumed that there was a rule against commandeering as a matter 
of constitutional structure, implicit deductions from general historical 
sources, and policy concerns.  
 
 
 21. U.S. CONST. amend. X.  
 22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  
 23. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  
 24. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (”[W]hile Congress has substantial 
power under the Constitution to encourage the States to provide for the disposal of the radioactive 
waste generated within their borders, the Constitution does not confer upon Congress the ability 
simply to compel the States to do so.”); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (“Congress 
cannot circumvent that [the rule of New York] by conscripting the State's officers directly. The Federal 
Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor 
command the States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal 
regulatory program.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss6/10
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In Printz v. United States, after saying that that “there is no 
constitutional text speaking to this precise question,”25 Justice Scalia did 
turn to specific historical materials directly on point. Unfortunately, those 
materials led more to the conclusion Scalia did not favor—that Congress 
could, when exercising its enumerated powers, require the states to help 
implement federal laws-than the conclusion Scalia actually adopted. 
Alexander Hamilton addressed the commandeering issue in the 
Federalist papers and wrote that “the legislatures, courts, and magistrates, 
of the respective members, will be incorporated into the operations of the 
national government as far as its just and constitutional authority extends; 
and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws.”26 Scalia’s 
response to this piece of historical evidence was singularly unpersuasive. 
He suggested that if this quote meant what it seems to say about the 
commandeering issue, then states would have to help implement federal 
law even when not asked, an absurd result.
27
 Of course, no one, not the 
federal government nor the dissenting Justices nor any scholar made this, 
as Scalia says, absurd argument. 
Scalia also suggested that Hamilton’s rule would be inconsistent with 
the Court’s holding in New York, a truly circular argument given that 
many believe New York was wrongly decided. Justice Stevens was far 
more persuasive when he pointed out, “it is hard to imagine a more 
unequivocal statement that state judicial and executive branch officials 
may be required to implement federal law where the National Government 
acts within the scope of its affirmative powers.”28 This one statement by 
Hamilton of course does not resolve the issue, but it is the most relevant 
history on point and should have shifted the burden of proof to those 
Justices who reached the contrary conclusion, at least for those judges who 
profess to abide by the dictates of originalism. 
Despite two Supreme Court cases on the subject, neither Justice Scalia 
nor Justice Thomas have come up with a shred of historical evidence that 
would contradict the clear meaning of the Tenth Amendment that, when 
Congress exercises its enumerated powers, its authority is supreme unless 
contradicted by another textual limitation. They did come up with 
numerous policy arguments for their non-textual anti-commandeering rule, 
but those should be a last resort to Justices who believe that textual and 
historical analysis are the only dispositive methods of constitutional 
 
 
 25. Printz, 521 U.S. at 905. 
 26. THE FEDERALIST NO. 27, at 223 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1885). 
 27. Printz, 521 U.S. at 899. 
 28. Id. at 947–48 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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interpretation. Perhaps this anti-commandeering holding is the best 
normative rule governing the relationship between state and federal power, 
but it is a living, breathing rule nonetheless. 
THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 
There is perhaps no better example of how Justices Scalia and Thomas 
ignore clear text and relevant history when it suits their purposes than their 
interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment, which provides: 
[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to 
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted 
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by 
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
29
 
The Eleventh Amendment quite obviously bars any suit, whether for 
damages or an injunction, against a state by citizens of “another” state. 
Both Justices Scalia and Thomas, however, have interpreted this language 
to bar lawsuits by citizens of a state against their home state.
30
 In other 
words, they have taken the word “another” and twisted it to mean “the 
same.” They engaged in this fancy word play despite the beliefs of four 
modern Justices that the Amendment only bars suits against states by 
citizens of a different state, consistent with the clear text.
31
 Obviously, 
they must have been convinced by some pretty clear history to so distort 
unambiguous text. 
In Justice Scalia’s only discussion of this issue, he relies not on the 
original meaning of the Eleventh Amendment to support the twisted 
reading but instead on Hans v. Louisiana,
32
 a case decided by the Supreme 
Court in 1890 (ninety-five years after the amendment was ratified), which 
adopted that bizarre reading of the Eleventh Amendment with little 
analysis. Of course, Justice Scalia has not allowed stare decisis concerns 
to block other votes to overturn important precedents, but that is not even 
the main point. The only Justice (Souter) who has ever embarked on a 
detailed analysis of the original meaning of the text of the Eleventh 
Amendment, and the reasons why Hans decided the case in the counter-
textual way it did, has demonstrated that there is no evidence that the 
people who ratified the Eleventh Amendment would have interpreted it to 
 
 
 29. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (emphasis added). 
 30. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54–57 (1996). 
 31. Id. at 100–02 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 32. 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss6/10
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block federal question lawsuits against states brought by citizens of other 
states.
33
 He also argued that the framers would never have associated the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity with federal question lawsuits against the 
states because in such cases, the federal government, not the states, is the 
“sovereign.” Neither Scalia nor Thomas has responded to Justice Souter’s 
treatise-like discussion of this issue, nor have they put forward persuasive 
evidence suggesting the Eleventh Amendment was intended only as one 
form of sovereign immunity (among other non-textual pre-constitutional 
principles) protecting the states from lawsuits.  
When Justices who say they are committed to text and history change 
the meaning of a clear word like “another” to the word “same,” affecting 
numerous civil rights statutes and other federal laws making it much more 
difficult for Congress to hold states accountable in federal court for 
violations of federal law, the burden of proof surely is on those Justices to 
justify their departure from their own doctrinal philosophy—a burden they 
have not met. Maybe our country is better off if states cannot be sued by 
citizens of other states for money damages in federal court, just as maybe 
the anti-commandeering rule adopted in New York and Printz may strike 
the proper balance between state and federal powers, but the justifications 
for these limitations on congressional power have been based on policy 
concerns, not on text or history. For Justices Scalia and Thomas, as is true 
for all Supreme Court Justices, these policy concerns should be fair game 
when trying to apply the majestic phrases in the Constitution to modern 
problems. What is not fair, however, is for these Justices to sternly lecture 
us (and other Justices), about the importance of sticking to text and history 
when they, whenever they deem it important enough, also stray from those 
principles.  
CONCLUSION 
Justices Scalia and Thomas have voted for broad rules limiting 
congressional power to enact campaign finance reform, to commandeer 
state legislatures and executives to help implement federal law, and to 
allow lawsuits against the states for money damages by citizens of other 
states. They also have adopted a rule that would prohibit any 
governmental official anytime and anywhere from using racial preferences 
to help foster greater racial equality. They have consistently failed, 
 
 
 33. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 110 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The history and structure of 
the Eleventh Amendment convincingly show that it reaches only to suits subject to federal jurisdiction 
exclusively under the Citizen–State Diversity Clauses.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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however, to justify these broad rules from a textual or historical 
perspective, and to adequately address historical evidence supporting 
different conclusions than those they reach. They may be good rules, and 
they may promote better relationships between the state and federal 
governments, and among the races, but if so, that is true because the 
Justices have made the old Constitution, and what it meant to those who 
ratified it, a new, flexible, and breathing document. It turns out that, in the 
hands of Justices Scalia and Thomas, the Constitution is not “dead, dead 
dead,” but very much alive and kickin.’ 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss6/10
